This study investigates the relationship between managerial optimism, investment efficiency, and firm valuation. This study follows the Campbell's measurement for managerial optimism and investigates the influences of the different levels of managerial optimism on improving investment efficiency and firm value when firms tend to under-invest or over-invest. The results indicate that an under-invested firm with a CEO who has a higher level of managerial optimism can improve the firm's investment efficiency by reducing the degree of underinvestment, which further increases the firm's value. However, when firms tend to overinvest, there is insufficient evidence to show that a firm with a lower level of CEO managerial optimism will effectively improve the firm's investment efficiency and increase firm value by reducing the degree of overinvestment. The results generated in this study help scholars and practitioners understand how managerial optimism affects the investment efficiency of firms. (JEL: G02, G30)
I. Introduction
The behavioral finance literature suggests that people make systematic errors in the way that they think. They may be optimistic or overconfident about the outcomes of decisions. Optimism means that individuals systematically overestimate the future outcome of an event (Heaton, 2002 , Lin et al., 2005 , Barros and Silveira, 2009 , Shefrin, 2001 ).
Overconfidence, similar to optimism, means that individuals overestimate their personal ability and thus put too much weight on their personal information or viewpoint (Barros and Silveira, 2009; Malmendier and Tate, 2005a; Hirshleifer et al., 2012) . Either way, their preferences may create distortions. Though these individual behavioral preferences, documented in many studies, affect asset pricing in the stock market (Barberis, Shlerifer, and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, David, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Barberis and Thaler, 2003) , only a handful of studies, Malmendier and Tate (2005a, b) , Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2011), and Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Low (2012) , investigate how these individual biases affect corporate investment decisions and investment efficiency, Malmendier and Tate (2005a, b) develop measures of CEO optimism and empirically confirm that the investment distortions of firms are associated with managerial personal attributes or behavioral biases. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2011) compute the magnitude of CFO miscalibration about future stock market return as the measure of overconfidence and conclude that top executives miscalibrate and that their miscalibrations significantly affect the investment behavior of their firms. Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Low (2012) using options-and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence, further document that firms with overconfident CEOs invest more in innovation activities and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. Making investment decisions is an integral and vital part of managing a firm. An efficient investment decision may be expected to enhance firm valuation. Although previous studies provide evidence that corporate investment is affected by managerial personal preference or behavior biases, these studies do not further address how managerial optimism affects a firm's investment efficiency, or whether managerial optimism helps to improve corporate investment efficiency and its association with firm valuation. Our study aims to fill this gap.
We hypothesize that an under-invested firm with a higher level of managerial optimism tends to invest more, given that an optimistic manager is usually willing to invest more (Glaser et al. 2008) . If this is the case, then we will observe that an under-invested firm with a higher level of managerial optimism will have higher capital investment, enhancing the firm's investment efficiency. We follow the research of Campbell et al. (2011) , which extends the work of Malmendier and Tate (2005) , and develop a measure of CEO optimism.
We also follow Biddle et al. (2009) , using an aggregated measure of ex-ante characteristics of a firm's cash and leverage ratios, to classify the under-and over-investment level of sample firms.
The main findings are summarized as follows: First, based on our optimism measurement, we find almost 40% of CEOs are optimistic in our sample, which is consistent with the prior studies (e.g., Campbell et al., 2011) . In addition, a firm with a highly optimistic CEO will invest more than firms whose CEOs have lower levels of optimism; this finding remains after implementing many robustness checks. Last, our findings indicate that an under-invested firm with a CEO that has a higher level of managerial optimism improves the firm's investment efficiency by reducing the amount of underinvestment, thereby increasing firm value. This is consistent with our hypotheses. However, our results do not provide sufficient evidence to support the other hypothesis when firms over-invest. That is, for an over-invested firm, a CEO with a lower level of managerial optimism does not appear to effectively improve the firm's investment efficiency and further increase firm value by reducing the level of overinvestment. We also investigate how CEO optimism affects investment decisions for firms under financial constraints. We find that optimistic CEOs in financially-constrained firms are still willing to increase their capital expenditure, also leading to increases in firm valuation.
Our study contributes to the literature that firms with a higher level of managerial optimism help to improve firm investment efficiency, especially when these firms are under-invested. Our study also complements the research in behavioral finance showing that corporate investment policy is affected by managerial psychological biases which might improve firm efficiency when firms do not have enough capital investment. Several studies are also related to our research. Heaton (2002) is the first study to examine whether managerial optimism affects corporate investment decisions. They find that an optimistic manager may avoid negative net present value projects which must be financed externally yet be more willing to undertake risky projects if they are loyal to shareholders and have the funds to do so. Campbell et al. (2011) find that CEO turnover is related to the level of CEO optimism. Boards terminate low-optimism and high-optimism CEOs more frequently than moderately-optimistic CEOs. They interpret this result as evidence that a moderate level of CEO optimism is more likely to choose a first-best investment level. Their findings provide further justification for our efforts to explore how CEO optimism affects firm investment efficiency and firm value.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes the literature and proposes the hypotheses statements; section 3 describes the data and variables; section 4 discusses the empirical methodology; section 5 presents the main empirical analyses and results; and section 6 concludes.
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
The major issue in this study is how managers with different levels of optimism affect the investment efficiency of their firms, and what the effect is for firms that are prone to under-or over-invest. To explore these ideas and develop our hypotheses, we summarize the literature below.
Researchers generally find that an optimistic manager is likely to believe and overestimate the probability that a good thing will happen, but underestimate the probability that a bad thing will happen (Heaton, 2002; Lin et al., 2005; Barros and Silveira, 2009; Shefrin, 2001; Glaser, 2008) . The managerial optimism tendency of systematically overestimating the future average cash flow of a firm is related to corporate policies regarding decisions such as investments, financing, dividend payouts, or acquisitions, and results in managerial decisions with a certain degree of irrationality. Heaton (2002) find that optimistic managers prefer internal financing to external financing because they believe market investors underestimate the value of their firm and thus hesitate to raise funds from the financial markets. Several empirical studies, such as Lin et al. (2008) and Hackbarth (2008) , confirm this theoretical prediction by Heaton (2002) and show that managerial optimism can explain pecking order preferences in financial decisions. Barros and Silveira (2009) further show that firms with optimistic managers will choose a more aggressive financing policy, resulting in firms that have higher leverage ratios, affecting their capital structure.
Managerial behavior tendencies may not only affect a firm's financing decisions but also impact its investment decisions. Jensen (1986) , using the concept of agency cost of free cash flow, predicts that managers may invest in negative NPV projects due to self-interest.
This agency cost between managers and shareholders may thus cause overinvestment, resulting in investment distortions. Myers and Majluf (1984) posit that the existence of information asymmetry between a firm's managers and outsiders will cause distorted investments, thus reducing the efficiency of capital investments.
The above studies, though they explore whether a firm's investment decision is associated with managerial attitudes, do not specifically investigate whether the investment distortion is affected by managerial psychological preferences, such as optimism. Malmendier and Tate (2005a) is the first study to consider managerial optimism in corporate investment decisions. They measure the timing of CEO's stock option exercise as the proxy for CEO optimism and find that overoptimistic CEOs are significantly more responsible for the firm's cash flow. By hand-collecting data on how the press portrays each CEO as the measure of managerial optimism, Malmendier and Tate (2005b) reconfirm their findings that managerial overoptimism accounts for corporate investment distortions. Using a unique database of German companies to proxy for managerial optimism, Glaser et al.(2008) show that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for firms with optimistic managers, which again supports the findings of Malmendier and Tate (2005a, b) . Malmendier and Tate (2008) further find that a highly optimistic CEO does not necessarily predict an acquisition decision, but that firms with highly optimistic CEOS and plentiful internal cash flow tend to make lower-quality acquisitions. This implies that optimistic managers may cause a firm to invest more than a firm with less optimistic managers, thereby exposing the firm to risk (Glaser et al., 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2008) .
A distorted investment, such as an over-or under-investment, may reduce the investment efficiency of a firm (Biddle et al., 2009) . Minimizing the investment distortion helps improve investment efficiency. In a perfect market all projects with positive net present value should be funded, thus enhancing firm valuation. Therefore, implementing a positive NPV project enhances investment efficiency . However, in the real world in which investors do not have same information as corporate managers, investment efficiency may be distorted either by limiting firms' ability to finance a potential project (Hubbard, 1998; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) or by inferior project selections, diversion of funds to perquisites, or even expropriation of resources by managers .
Several papers investigate how to improve investment efficiency in the context of market imperfection. Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009) show that either improvement in accounting quality or reporting quality aids in alleviating information asymmetries that reduce both over-and under-investment possibility. However, no financial study to date directly examines how to improve investment efficiency, with the exception of studies of accounting approaches. This study seeks to understand whether managerial optimism affects the investment efficiency of a firm and in what circumstances managerial optimism minimizes investment distortion.
Studies indicate that managers with higher level of optimism are more sensitive to cash flows and may forgo positive net present value projects if internal funds are insufficient.
Meanwhile, research also suggests that managers with a certain degree of optimism tend to undertake riskier projects because they overestimate the future payoff, meaning that they increase investment (Heaton, 2002; Barros and Silveira, 2009; Shefrin, 2001; Goel and Thakor, 2008) . Based on the above analyses, we predict that an optimistic CEO of a firm with plenty of cash flow (under-investing) will be less concerned about costly external financing and thus more willing to undertake a risky project expected to have higher returns.
On the other hand, an over-invested firm with a less optimistic CEO should follow more conservative investment policies, resulting in decreased capital expenditure. Thus, we propose the first hypothesis:
H1 a : A firm with a high possibility of underinvestment and whose CEO is highly optimistic will invest more than a similar firm whose CEO has a low level of optimism.
H1 b : A firm with a high possibility of overinvestment and whose CEO has a low level of optimism will invest less than a similar firm whose CEO is highly optimistic.
When a distorted investment may reduce the investment efficiency of a firm, managerial sentiment may thus impact a firm's value. Gervais et al. (2002) is the first paper to provide a theory showing that moderately optimistic managers are more likely to take on risky investment projects which are in the best interest of shareholders than rational managers. Goel and Thakor (2008) explain theoretically the reason that a CEO with moderate overoptimism helps diminish underinvestment inefficiency. This is because an overoptimistic CEO may overestimate the probability of a high payoff and thus be more willing to bear risks in accepting projects. Because an overoptimistic CEO is more willing to invest in projects with low probabilities of high payoff, this may improve investment efficiency for an underinvested firm, enhancing shareholders' wealth. Campbell et al. (2011) follows a logic similar to that of Gervais et al. (2002) and Goel and Thakor (2008) 
III. Data and Variables

Sample and Data
The variable of interest is CEO optimism and the main dependent variables include investment (Invest) and Firm value (Value). To measure CEO optimism, we rely on the data collected from ExecuComp database which provides information about CEO compensation in terms of salary, bonus, and stock options granted from 1992 to 2009. Investment is measured by the sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditures, and acquisition expenditure minus cash receipts from sales of property, plant, and equipment, then divided by lagged total assets (Biddle et al., 2009 ). Firm value is defined as Tobin's Q.
Tobin's Q is sum of market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity divided by total asset (Baker et al., 2003) .
We collect the data on ownership structure from the Compact D/SEC database, Thomson
Reuters, and the Corporate Library. The measure provided by Gompers et al. (2003) is used as a proxy for external governance. A higher score indicates a higher level of anti-takeover provisions imposed, implying that shareholders' rights in those firms is weaker. The number of analysts following is collected from the I/B/E/S database.
Accounting data is collected from Compustat database. We delete firm-year observations that have missing data related to our dependent variables, independent variables and any of our optimism measures. We further exclude firms in the utilities industry (SIC codes 4900-4999) and firms in financial industries (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) due to their special capital structure and investment characteristics. All variables used in this study are defined in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 is inserted about here]
The Measurement of Managerial Optimism
As mentioned, previous studies have applied a variety of proxies for managerial optimism as this phenomenon of managerial bias is not only difficult to directly observe but also difficult to measure (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a, b; Campbell et al., 2011 Although firms might deviate their optimal investment ratio due to the defects of market imperfection, the measure of such deviation is conceptually and empirically difficult.
In this paper, we postulate that certain firm-specific characteristics are likely to affect the possibility of firms to over-or under-invest. Several studies indicate that a higher cash ratio increases the possibility of managers deciding to make inefficient investments (Jensen, 1986; Opler et al., 1999; . By the same token, firms with higher leverage ratio may suffer more severe problems of bankruptcy or debt overhang, forcing them to under-invest (Myers, 1977 (Myers, , 1984 . Since the cash balance and leverage ratio may affect firm's investment level, we adopt the method used by Biddle et al. (2009) and use these two variables to proxy for over-and under-investment. We first multiply leverage by -1 so that it resembles cash in that when it increases the tendency is towards overinvestment. We then rank the firms into deciles by each of these two variables for each year. Because the general leverage level across industries may vary over time, we also consider industry effects across the sample period (Lang et al., 1996) and rank firms within the industry 1 . Next we re-scale this to a range of 0 to 1. Based on the average ranked value of cash and leverage, we can obtain a composite score measure which is computed as the average of the ranked values of the two variables 2 . We further define two dummy variables: OverInvest (representing firms that are more prone to over-invest) when the composite score is near 1 (the top 25% of the sample firm), and UnderInvest (representing firms that are more prone to under-invest) when the composite score is near 0 (the lowest 25% of the sample firm).
Methodology
Difference Test
To test the hypotheses, we first classify all sample firms into two subsamples: firms prone to under-invest and firms prone to over-invest, based on their ex-ante characteristics of firm cash balance and firm leverage. We then conduct a difference test on each of these subsamples, comparing investment ratio and firm value between high-and low-optimism CEOs. We predict that the average investment or firm value of firms with highly optimistic CEOs will significantly be higher than those of firms with CEOs low in optimism.
Regression Specifications
We further apply multiple panel regressions to test the relation between investment and CEO optimism when firms are more prone to under-or over-invest in the overall sample.
The estimated models are:
where Invest is the investment ratio, our main dependent variable, measured by capital expenditures divided by lagged total assets. HighOpti is the high-optimism CEO indicator, which is 1 if CEOs are classified as having a high level of optimism and 0 otherwise.
LowOpti is the low-optimism CEO indicator, which is 1 if CEOs are classified as having a low level of optimism and 0 otherwise. OverInvest and UnderInvest are respectively used to classify firms as being more prone to over-or under-invest as described in section 3.3. We use the OLS method to estimate Models (1a) and (1b). We adjust the standard errors for heteroskedasticity, serial-, and cross-sectional correlation using a one dimensional cluster at the firm level (Petersen, 2009) . We also include industry and year fixed-effects in the regression specifications. 49-industry classification provided by Fama and French (1997) is used to control the industry shocks to the investment.
These control variables include financial variables, such as firm size, market to book ratio, industry leverage, operating cash flow to sales, slack, operating cycle, dividend, past one-year stock return, and other governance variables, including CEO ownership, CEO-equity-based pay, institutional ownership, analyst following, and Gomper et al. (2003) index (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Biddle et al., 2009; Glaser et al., 2008; Heaton, 2002; Hubbard, 1998; Jensen, 1986 Jensen, , 1993 Lin et al., 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2005a, b; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) . Previous studies indicated that the level of investment depends on the cash flow sensitivity and growth opportunities (Hubbard, 1998; Heaton, 2002; Lin et al., 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2005a, b) . Firms may forgo positive net present value projects if they do not have sufficient internal funds. They tend to increase investment if they see plentiful growth opportunities. Therefore we control for the effect of internal funding and growth opportunities on investment. The operating cash flow to sales, operating cycle, the level of slack, and dividend are used to proxy for internal funding. A higher level of firm leverage more easily induces the problem of debt-overhang and leads to underinvestment (Myers, 1977 (Myers, , 1984 , therefore we control for the leverage effect in the regression. Lamont (2000) argues that changes in the discount rate will affect the level of investment. Their empirical evidence finds that investment is positively associated with stock return. Therefore, we control for past stock returns in the regression.
Agency conflicts between managers and shareholders have been documented to have a significant impact on the optimal investment of firms. The empire building tendency or entrenchment behaviors of managers may lead firms to deviate from their optimal investment choices, affecting investment level (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Biddle et al., 2009; Jensen, 1986 Jensen, , 1993 Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) . Therefore, we also include governance variables in the regression as the controls.
Our first hypothesis states that different levels of CEO optimism will reduce underand over-investment when firms are more prone to under-or over-invest. 
where Value is the firm value measured by Tobin's Q.
According to our second hypothesis, CEO optimism contributes to the value of a firm when firms are classified as more prone to over-or under-invest. We use Model (2a) to test H2a by estimating whether the coefficient 3  is larger than zero, and we use Model (2b) to test H2b by estimating whether the coefficient 3  is larger than zero (H2a : 3  >0 when firms are prone to under-invest; H2b : 3  >0 when firms are prone to over-invest.). We also control the governance variables and other financial variables such as firm size, the level of capital expenditure (Capex/size), Profitability, and Leverage which have been shown to be significantly related to firm performance in the literature (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Baek, et al., 2004) . Table 2 presents the summary statistics of CEOs with different levels of optimism.
Empirical Analysis
Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 presents the distribution of CEO optimism across two different sample periods. We first test whether the distribution of CEO optimism is similar to that of Campbell et al. (2011) . We find that 37.61% of the CEOs have a high level of optimism and 10.23% of the CEOs have a low level of optimism for the period 1992 to 2005. The distribution of CEO optimism is close to that of Campbell et al. (2011) .
[ Table 2 is inserted about here]
Panel B of Table 2 Glaser et al. (2008) .
[ Table 3 is inserted about here] Table 4 presents the mean (median) differences in investment ratio and firm value for firms with different levels of CEO optimism. The mean (median) investment ratio of firms with high-optimism CEOs is significantly higher than for firms with low-optimism CEOs.
Univariate Analyses
This indicates that firms with high-optimism CEOs invest more than firms with low-optimism CEOs. If we divide the investment ratio into two proportions, capital investment (Ic) and noncapital investment (In), and compare the investment ratios under different levels of CEO optimism, we also find that both the capital investment ratio and noncapital investment ratio of firms with high-optimism CEOs are significantly higher than those of firms with low-optimism CEOs.
The mean (median) firm value of firms with high-optimism CEOs is also significantly higher than those with low high-optimism CEOs. This implies that such firms generally have higher firm valuations if they have high-optimism CEOs. The univariate comparisons
show that managerial optimism could affect the investment behavior and firm valuations as well.
[ Given that the mean investment equals 17.09%, this effect represents an increase of 3.41%.
These findings provide consistent support for Hypothesis H 1a . On the other hand, the coefficient of the interaction term LowOpti*OverInvest is not significant in Models 5 and 6, which is inconsistent with our prediction under H 1b . In sum, we find that the empirical evidence partially supports our hypothesis that when firms are more prone to under-invest, high levels of CEO optimism will help improve a firm's investment efficiency. On the other hand, when firms are more prone to over-invest, low levels of CEO optimism will not significantly affect a firm's investment efficiency.
[ HighOpti*UnderInvest in Models 3 and 4 are significantly positive, which are consistent with our prediction. In terms of the economic significance, increasing CEO optimism by one standard deviation increases firm valuation by approximately 11.07% among firms that are under-investing. Given that the mean firm value equals 2.42, this effect represents an increase of 4.58%. However, the coefficients of interaction term LowOpti*OverInvest in Models 5 and 6 are not significant, which fails to support H 2b . In sum, when firms are prone to under-invest, their firm value increases when they have a highly optimistic CEO, but when firms are prone to over-invest, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that firm value will increase when their CEO has a low level of optimism.
[ Table 6 is inserted about here]
Unconditional test
Our analysis thus far has been conditional on the firm being in a setting where over-or under-investment is more likely. However, it is possible that firms with certain firm characteristics choose optimistic CEOs or induce higher levels of optimism in their CEOs.
To explore this issue, we conduct the following tests: first, we investigate the changes in investment ratio and firm value surrounding a high/low optimistic CEO turnover or when CEO optimism becomes high/low; second, we examine the relation between the firm investment ratio and high/low optimism CEOs before they show their optimism attitudes.
Explicitly, we replace the dependent variable with the firm's investment in the years prior to the optimistic CEO joining the firm and limit the sample to firm-years prior to the CEO joining. Finally, we estimate a multinomial logistic regression that tests the association between the CEO optimism and the likelihood of over-or under-investing. The empirical results are reported in Tables 7 to 9 . Table 7 presents the results for the changes in investment ratio and firm value surrounding a high/low optimistic CEO turnover or when CEO optimism becomes high/low.
Year t is defined as the year in which a high/low optimism CEO is turned over or when CEO optimism becomes high/low. Panels A and B of Table 7 report the change in investment ratio and firm value relative to year t1 when a high/low optimistic CEO turnover. The mean and median changes in investment ratio and firm value between year t-1 and years t+1, t+2, and t+3 are negative and statistically significant at the 10% level or better in Panel A, indicating that investment ratio and firm value decrease significantly after a high optimism CEO leaves.
Panel B reports that the mean and median changes in investment ratio and firm value between year t-1 and years t+1 are positive but statistically not significant for those firms with a low optimism CEO turnover. We also investigate the changes in investment ratio and firm value when CEO optimism becomes high/low. The results from Panel C indicate that investment ratio and firm value significantly increase when CEO optimism becomes high, except for the non-significant increase in investment ratio in year t+3. However, no significant decrease is observed in Panel D when CEO optimism becomes low. The empirical analyses from Table 7 indicate that the investment ratio and firm value are partially affected by the level of CEO optimism, especially when the CEOs have a high level of optimism. The investment ratio and firm value are both observed to significantly decrease when a high optimism CEO leaves the firm, but both significantly increase when CEO optimism becomes high.
[ Table 7 is inserted about here]
We further limit our sample to firm-years prior to when CEO optimism becomes high/low and examine the relation between the firm investment ratio and high/low optimistic CEOs as they exhibit their optimism attitudes. The results from Table 8 report that the coefficients on HighOpti and LowOpti are both not significant, indicating that firm's investment behavior in past years is not significantly associated with the level of CEO optimism.
[ Table 8 is inserted about here]
The results of testing the association between the CEO optimism and the likelihood of over-or under-investing are reported in Table 9 . The coefficient associated with HighOpti (high CEO optimism) in Model 1 of Panel A is significantly negative, indicating that high CEO optimism significantly decreases the possibility of underinvestment, which is also consistent with our main results, reported in previous tables. However, the coefficient associated with LowOpti (low CEO optimism) in Model 4 of Panel B is not significant, indicating that low CEO optimism does not significantly decrease the possibility of overinvestment. The results from Table 5 to Table 9 generally support our hypothesis H 1a that firms with a high optimism CEO are more likely to decrease the possibility of underinvestment and improve the investment efficiency of the firm, but the above implication does not apply to CEOs with a low level of optimism.
[ Table 9 is inserted about here] Table 10 . The coefficients of the interaction term HighOpti*UnderInvest are still significantly positive in Model 1 for both panels, consistent with the results in Table 5 and Table 6 .
[ of Panel A(B) in Table 10 shows that a high level of optimism among other top executives in firms exhibiting underinvestment will significantly improve the investment efficiency and therefore enhance firm valuation. We also implement the same test during the period from 1992 to 2005 in the section C (Models 5 and 6) to avoid the sample selection problem, and the results still hold. 
Different measures of investment ratio
Our measure of investment spending includes both capital expenditures and non-capital expenditures. As a robustness check, we decompose the overall investment ratio and consider two components, Capital investment, which is defined as the capital expenditures, scaled by lagged property, plant, and equipment of the previous year, and
Noncapital investment, defined as the sum of R&D expenditures and acquisitions, scaled by lagged total assets. We then re-estimate our main model using these two measures of investment ratios. Table 11 still shows findings similar to those of the main results displayed in Table 5 .
[ Table 12 reports the estimates of our 2SLS regressions. We find that the coefficient of ment t invesˆis significantly positive in Model 1, indicating that underinvested firms with high CEO optimism exhibit more efficient investment decisions, which in turn increase firm value. However, we do not find a significant relation between the improvement in investment efficiency and firm value for an over-invested firm with low CEO optimism.
[ Table 12 is inserted about here] 5.3.4. Relationship between investment/firm value, financial constraints, and CEO optimism Previous studies show that high-optimism CEOs display greater investment-cash flow sensitivity in financially constrained firms (Heaton, 2002; Lin et al., 2005) . However, it is unclear how CEO optimism affects investment decisions under financial constraints. We conjecture that high-optimism optimism CEOs of financial constrained firms will still be willing to invest because they may overestimate the payoff the projects and underestimate the risk. Table 13 reports the OLS regression coefficients of investment on CEO optimism and financial constraints. We measure an index of financial constraints for each firm based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . Each year we measure the Kaplan-Zingales index as the proxy for firm's financial constraints and then rank firms by level of constraint, from the smallest to largest. We define the lowest 30% firms based on the Kaplan-Zingales index as the least financially constrained firms and the highest 30% of firms as the most financially constrained firms. The most_constrained dummy and least_constrained dummy are included in the regression model to investigate how CEO optimism affects investment under financial constraints. The results of Models 1 and 2 in panel A of Table 13 indicate that CEOs with high optimism (HighOpti) will tend to invest more than those with less optimism, which is consistent with our prediction. We observe that the coefficient of most_constrained is significantly negative at the 5% level. As expected, highly constrained firms will spend less on capital expenditure. The interaction term HighOpti*most_constrained is also significantly positive at the 5% level, which indicates that a highly optimistic CEO is more willing to increase capital expenditure even when the firm is financially constrained. This finding is consistent with our conjecture that an optimism CEO of financially constrained firms are still willing to invest because they may overestimate the payoff of projects and underestimate the risks.
[ Table 13 is inserted about here] Models 3 and 4 in panel A report the results of the investment level for firms with low optimism CEOs and with the least financial constraints. We find that firms with the least financial constraints will tend to invest more than firms with more financial constraints. However, we found no significant evidence showing that low optimism CEOs in less financially constrained firms will decrease firm investment. The general results from Panel A of Table 13 indicate that high optimism CEOs tend to increase their capital expenditure, but this tendency still exists when firms face high financial constraints, while low optimism CEOs are not observed to significantly affect firm investment level even when firms are less financially constrained.
Panel B of Table 13 also reports the association among firm valuation, CEO optimism and firm financial constraints. The results of Table 13 report that the coefficient of HighOpti is significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that high-optimism CEOs contribute to higher firm valuation. If firms are financially constrained, they have significantly lower firm value than those without financial constraints. Interestingly, we find that CEO optimism significantly increases firm valuation when firms are financially constrained. This corresponds to the findings in Panel A of Table 13 and indicates that an optimistic CEO tends to increase firm investment even under financial constraints, which may lead to an increase in firm valuation. In addition, we also find that firms with the least financial constraints tend to have higher firm values than firms with high financial constraints.
However, there is no significant evidence showing that low optimism CEOs in less financially constrained firms will increase firm value.
[ Table 13 is inserted about here]
Discussion and Conclusions
Studies suggest that corporate investment is affected by managerial personal preferences and behavior biases, but these studies do not directly address how managerial optimism affects a firm's investment efficiency, or whether managerial optimism helps to improve corporate investment efficiency. In this study, we focus on how managerial optimism affects a firm's investment efficiency and its association to firm valuation. We first measure the level of CEO optimism (Campbell et al., 2011) and identify firms that are prone to under-invest or over-invest (Biddle et al., 2009 ). We find that almost 40% of CEOs are optimistic in our sample, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Glaser 2008) . Firms with a highly optimistic CEO will invest more than firms whose CEOs have lower levels of optimism. In addition, our findings indicate that an under-invested firm with a CEO that has a high level of managerial optimism improves the firm's investment efficiency by reducing the amount of underinvestment, thereby increasing firm value, consistent with our hypotheses. However, when firms tend to over-invest, our results do not provide sufficient evidence to support the other hypotheses. An over-invested firm that has a low optimism CEO is not found to effectively improve the firm's investment efficiency and increase firm value by reducing the level of overinvestment. Our main empirical results still hold after several tests of robustness. We also find that an optimistic CEO tends to increase firm investment even under financial constraints and also leads to an increase in firm valuation.
Table 1. Definitions of Variables Used in this Study
Variable Definition
Panel A: Dependent Variables Investment (Invest)
The sum of research and development expenditure, capital expenditures, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from sales of property, plant, and equipment and divided by lagged total assets. Capital Investment (Ic) Capital expenditures divided by lagged sales of property, plant, and equipment.
Noncapital Investment (In)
The sum of research and development expenditure and acquisition expenditure and divided by lagged total assets.
Firm value (Value)
Market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity divided by total assets. Book equity is calculated as total assets minus total liabilities minus preferred stock liquidating value plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit. (Tobin's Q, following Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003, and Tate, 2005a) .
Panel B: Measures of Optimism High-optimism CEO indicator (HighOpti)
An indicator variable that equals 1 for all years if the CEO exercises stock options at (or more than) 100% moneyness at least twice for the studied period, and 0 otherwise.
Low-optimism CEO indicator (LowOpti)
An indicator variable that equals 1 for all years if the CEO exercises stock options at (or less than) 30% moneyness at least twice for the studied period, and 0 otherwise.
Panel C: Investment Variables OverInvest
We first rank firms into quartiles based on their cash balance and adjusted leverage (we multiply adjusted leverage by minus one before ranking). An observation is classified as an overinvestment firm (OverInvest) when the average value is in the top quartiles.
UnderInvest
Following the above calculation, an observation is classified as an underinvestment firm (UnderInvest) when the average value is in the bottom quartiles.
Cash ratio
The ratio of cash divided by total assets; firms with more cash may tend to over-invest.
Leverage
The ratio of long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity; firms with more leverage or debt may tend to under-invest.
Ind. leverage
The mean ratio of firms in the same industry for each year. The industry is defined based on Fama & French 49-industry classification, provided there are at least twenty firms in one industry.
Panel D: Other Independent Variables
Firm size Natural log of book total assets; used to measure the size of a firm.
M/B
Market value of equity divided by book value of equity; used to measure the growth opportunity of a firm.
CF/sale
The ratio of operating income before depreciation to sales; used to measure the asset management efficiency of a firm.
Slack
The ratio of cash to total property, plant, and equipment; used to measure the financial slack of a firm.
Operating Cycle
The log of receivables to sales plus inventory to cost of goods sold multiplied by 360; used to measure the operating cycle of a firm.
Capx/sale
The ratio of capital expenditures to sales.
Profitability
The ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. Return Cumulative monthly stock returns over past 12 months.
Dividend
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm paid a dividend that year, and 0 otherwise.
CEO ownership
The fraction of outstanding shares held by the CEO.
CEO-equity-based pay
The percentage of equity-based compensation (stock option and restricted stock grants) in a CEO's total compensation.
GIM index
Taken from Gompers et al. (2003) , based on 24 antitakeover provisions as the proxy for antitakeover provisions. Higher index levels correspond to more managerial power.
Pension Own
The fraction of outstanding shares held by the 18 largest public pension funds (as in Cremers and Nair, 2005) .
Analysts
The number of analysts following the firm. most_constrained An indicator variable that equals 1 for all years if firms are within the highest 30% of Kaplan-Zingales index, and 0 otherwise; we calculate the Kaplan-Zingales index based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . least_constrained An indicator variable that equals 1 for all years if firms are within the lowest 30% of Kaplan-Zingales index, and 0 otherwise. Table 1 and are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. Differences in means and medians are assessed using t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The number of observations varies due to data availability. *** represents 1% significance level. Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The model includes year and industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French 49 industry classifications. t-Statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a one-way cluster at the firm level. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The model includes year and industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French 49 industry classifications. t-Statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a one-way cluster at the firm level. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. Note: This table presents mean and median changes in investment and firm value between the year preceding a high/low optimistic CEO turnover or when CEO optimism becomes high/low (year -1) and three years following the changes (years +1 to +3). Panels A and B show the changes in investment and firm value as a high/low optimism CEO turns over, respectively. Panels C and D show the changes in investment and firm value when moderate optimism CEOs become high/low optimism CEOs, respectively. All variables are as defined in the Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. Differences in means and medians are assessed using t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. (year t-1) . The dependent variable is firm investment prior to the year when CEO optimism becomes high/low. We limit our sample to firm-year observations prior to when a CEO shows her/his optimism attitude. All variables are as defined in the Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The model includes year and industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French 49 industry classifications. t-Statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a one-way cluster at the firm level. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. results from multinomial logit pooled regressions. The dependent variable is based on the level of firm over-or under-investment. Firm-year observations in the bottom quartile of firm average ranked value of cash and leverage are classified as under-investment, observations in the top quartile are classified as over-investment, and the observations in the middle two quartiles are classified as the benchmarking group. Panel A(B) presents the results for a model predicting the likelihood that a firm is likely to under-or overinvest when a firm has high(low) optimism CEO. Other variables are as defined in the Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. t-Statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and clustering of observations by firm. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. (panel B) . In Section A, we test our hypotheses by using a new metric of over-or under-investment. We first estimate a firm-specific model of investment as a function of growth opportunities (as measured by sales growth) in each industry, which is based on Fama and French 49-industry classification: investment i,t+1 =θ 0 +θ 1 * sales_growth i,t +ε i,t+1 sales_growth i,t is the change in sale (from year t-1 to year t). We further classified firms based on the calculated residuals (difference from the predicted investment) and sort them yearly based in the residuals from the above equation. Firm-year observations in the top quartiles are classified as over investment (OverInvest) whereas those in the bottom quartiles are classifies as under investment (UnderInvest). In Section B, we replace CEO optimism with other top executives' optimism in the regression analyses. In Section C, we repeat the analyses in the period from 1992 to 2005, the same studied period as Campbell et al. (2011) . All variables are as defined in the Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The model includes year and industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French 49 industry classifications. t-Statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a one-way cluster at the firm level. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. Note: This table presents the regression analyses of firm characteristics and CEO optimism (as in Table 5 ) by different measures of investment ratios. Panel A reports the results of the capital investment and Panel B reports the results of non-capital investment. All variables are as defined in the Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The model includes year and industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French 49 industry classifications. t-Statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a one-way cluster at the firm level. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. Model 1 reports the results for the firms with high optimism CEOs and model 2 reports the results for the firms with low optimism CEOs. All variables are as defined in the Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The model includes year and industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French 49 industry classifications. t-Statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a one-way cluster at the firm level. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. (Panel B) . Models 1 and 2 investigate whether high optimism CEOs affect investment under financial constraints. Models 3 and 4 test whether low optimism CEOs increase investment for firms with fewer financial constraints. All variables are as defined in the Table 1 and winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The model includes year and industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French 49 industry classifications. t-Statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a one-way cluster at the firm level. The number of observations varies because of data unavailability. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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